Averting War through Election Rigging and a Pro-Republican Constitution

With very few exceptions, no one in Ireland wanted to fight each other. The period between January 1922 to June 1922 was spent in various negotiations, meetings, and conventions in an attempt to reach peace (many of those attempts we’ve already discussed in previous episodes), but all attempts failed. Still, even while Rory O’Connor, Liam Mellows, and even Liam Lynch went around the country preparing for war, Collins was confident he could keep Ireland together through a combination of a pro-treaty victory in a general election and the publication of the Irish Constitution. The constitution he was currently writing (in addition to all his other responsibilities) was going to either undo or negate many of the treaty terms Collins agreed to with the British, including the absence of any mention to an oath of loyalty to the monarchy. He was confident he could get Britain to approve the pro-republican constitution considering the deteriorating situation in Ireland.

The Electoral Pact

 Before he could share the constitution, he needed to hold elections. The British determined that general elections should be held sooner rather than later and Griffith agreed with them. He wanted an election held no later than June. To hold an election, the Provisional Government’s forces needed to be able to guarantee they could protect the election polls and officers and/or they needed an agreement from the anti-treaty side that they wouldn’t derail election attempts.

Remember that the election is being organized while Rory holds the Four Courts, Collins is planning an invasion of Northern Ireland, Collins and co are writing the state constitution, Mulcahy is still meeting with anti-treaty IRA members, holding and canceling army conventions, and building a national army, and the new police force, the Civic Guard, are inching towards mutiny. Britain still had 5,000 soldiers in Dublin under the command of General MacCready and they were getting nervous they would need to recommit soldiers to the Green Isle if the Provisional Government couldn’t get its shit together.

So, with all of this in mind, Collins reached out to DeValera and created the ‘electoral pact’. They agreed that the seats in the Dail would be split in proportion to the 64-57 division in the Dail Treaty vote. The split would be artificially preserved. It seems that neither men thought the rest of Ireland would be upset with perpetual election rigging. Collins certainly didn’t expect Griffith’s soul to shatter when the pact was brought before the Cabinet for approval. According to Ernest Blythe, when Griffith was asked to approve the pact, he:

“worked nervously with his neck-tie in silence. He took off his glasses and wiped them…his hand was shaking so that he could hardly hold them.” – Charles Townshend, the Republic, pg. 398

He remained silent for three minutes before he finally agreed to the pact. Afterwards, he never referred to Collins as Mick or Collins again, only as Mr. Collins.

The Irish Constitution

With the ‘electoral pact’ in his back pocket, Collins worked with a drafting committee to write a republican constitution. This constitution was important enough to convince anti-treaty IRA men like Lynch and Frank Aikens to pause hostilities until the constitution could be reviewed. Lynch wrote to his brother on March 6^th:

“if we can force the Treaty party to draw up a Republican constitution we are A1 again” which he thought was “quite possible” – Charles Townshend, the Republic, pg. 399

The Constitution committee wrote three different drafts, Draft A, Draft B, and Draft C. Collins went with Draft B which included the proposal for an upper house (the Senate) designed to protect minorities, an executive that contained non-elected ministers, and didn’t mention the oath at all. Collins severely underestimated how angry and frightened the English government was.

First, they were furious over the electoral pact. They told Collins it was unacceptable as they couldn’t accept a government where half the members didn’t accept the treaty. One can imagine Collins’ reaction to Britain’s refusal to support the one thing that could avoid a civil war and his mood rapidly deteriorated when Britian also rejected his proposed constitution.  Lloyd George wrote that it was a “complete evasion of the Treaty and a setting up of a republic with a thin veneer”. (Charles Townshend, The Republic, pg. 400). He claimed that the constitution would turn the British Empire into a laughingstock and ignored the principle of a unified Commonwealth foreign policy.

Instead of considering the situation on the ground in Ireland, they were determined to force a formal acknowledgement of the monarchy’s power over Ireland, even if it risked the treaty and relations between Ireland and England, let alone a civil war. Basically, the English didn’t want to admit what DeValera would make true by 1937 – they had lost enough control of Ireland to not really have any claim over the island. Desperate not to appear impotent and to save face over losing a piece of “their empire”, they bullishly focused on symbolism, hoping that would be enough to retain control over Ireland.

They clearly, still, didn’t understand the Irish people very well.

Collins was furious. He claimed:

“A few months ago, we could have got a Constitution on practically definitely Gaelic lines. The first was made impossible by the actions and attitude of the Opposition. Suspicions of the British were aroused, and, more unfortunately, our weakness fully shown up. If the whole of nationalist Ireland had had the simple honesty to accept the Treaty for what it was worth I believe we could have got a Gaelic constitution based on the fact of our freedom and our general authority, that the British would have to acquiesce.” – Bill Kissane, the Politics of the Irish Civil War, pg. 72

The General Election

He was so disgusted with the entire affair and knew the constitution was no longer the saving grace he had promised it would be, printed the constitution the day of the general election. To make matters worse, because of British pressure, Collins could not support the “electoral pact”. While he didn’t publicly repudiate the pact, he told voters in Cork on the eve of the election to “vote for the candidates you think best of” and “the electors of Cork think will carry on best in the future the work they want carried on” (Charles Townshend, the Republic, pg. 402). The next day he told voters in his hometown to support the pact “in the spirit in which it was made” and that it was “their duty to vote for the people they thought would carry out that policy.” (Charles Townshend, the Republic, pg. 402). Altogether the Pro-treaty Sinn Fein deputies combined with the Labour, Farmers, and Independent deputies brought the pro-Treaty majority to 92 out of 128 seats, with 78% of the votes cast.

The election results were devastating to the anti-treaty supporters of Ireland. Dorothy Macardle, a famous writer and anti-treaty supporter, wrote that the election result was

“not only the end of the Irish Republic, but the end of Republicanism in Ireland” – Charles, Townshend, the Republic, pg. 403

Not only had the anti-treaty side lost the general election, but they were splintering because they didn’t know how to respond to the provisional government’s actions. Tom Barry proposed sending the remaining British forces an ultimatum to evacuate Ireland within 72 hours or there would be war. This idea was voted down, but the minority that supported it broke away and created their own IRA with McKelvey as the new chief of staff, instead of the original chief of staff, Liam Lynch.

The Provisional Government Forced into Action

Following the general election, the British were the most eager to take aggressive action against the anti-treaty forces. Churchill bombarded Griffith with letters demanding action, and, in one hysterical letter, claimed:

“Rich and poor turned out of their homes on two hours notice…leaving behind them the inheritance of generations and generations…The cattle are killed, the lonely white peacocks hunted to death – some of the scenes are like those of the French Revolution. Until somehow or other we find a means of putting an end to this state of affairs, our boast of civilization in these Islands is stultified.” – Charles Townshend, the Republic, pg. 403

The Assassination of Henry Wilson

The British reached their breaking point with the assassination of Henry Wilson. Wilson’s reputation and legacy is tied to his assassination, but at the time, he was considered to be a troublemaker and a lightning rod for the Irish cause. He didn’t move against the Ulster Volunteers in 1913, he supported the conscription of the Irish during World War I, in 1919, he wrote that a “little bloodletting” was needed in Ireland, and thought the truce was “rank, filthy cowardice”. Apparently he told Lloyd George that he “did not speak to murderers” and would arrest DeValera when he stepped foot in London. Lloyd George replied, “Oh nonsense. In public life we must do these things.” (Keith Jeffry, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: A Political Soldier, pg 274-275).

This broke the relationship between Lloyd George and Wilson and he resigned from the army and ran for election in February 1922. He was determined to overthrow Lloyd George’s government. After resigning, Wilson advised the Northern Ireland government on security, encouraging Craig to recruit loyal Catholics and Protestants into the force (which Craig ignored) and to appoint an army commander over the police force to ensure discipline. Given his history and his firm believes, Wilson was seen as a key instigator of violence in Northern Ireland with Collins calling him “A violent Orange partisan.”

Wilson was shot outside his house at 36 Eaton Place on June 22, 1922. He was in full uniform and received six wounds in total to the chest. Only two were fatal. His assassins, Reginald Dunne and Joseph O’Sullivan, were arrested on the same day, but only after an intense struggle and the wounding of a chauffeur and at least four other police officers. Dunne and O’Sullivan were hung on August 10^th, 1922. Dunne said, before his execution, that Wilson:

“was at the time of his Death the Military Advisor to what is colloquially called the Ulster Government, and as Military Advisor he raised and organized a body of men known as the Ulster Special Constabulary, who are the principal agents in his region of terror” – Foul deeds in Kensington and Chelsea, John J. Eddleston, pg. 107

Reginald Dunne and Joseph O’Sullivan were members of the anti-treaty IRA and it’s unclear, to this day, if anyone ordered the assassination or if it was a desperate act by Dunne and O’Sullivan to provoke Britain to invade and until Ireland once more against the Crown forces. There are scholars, to this day, who believe Collins may have been responsible for Wilson’s death. Of course, this doesn’t make sense if Collins was dedicated to avoiding war with Britain and upholding the treaty. However, we must remember that Collins and Mulcahy were coordinating a northern offensive with Frank Aikens and other northern IRA units to “protect” the northern Catholics and maybe unite the anti-treaty and pro-treaty forces in an offensive to “take back” the north. Assassinating key northern leaders makes sense if a massive offensive was in place, but we know that the northern offensive sputtered into a disaster for key anti-treaty units, so why assassinate Wilson at all?

It’s possible, the assassination of Wilson was part of the plans for the northern offensive and, even though Collins didn’t give the order, Dunne and O’Sullivan followed through anyway. However, if Wilson was a target, then Collins only shared that information with certain IRA members, because when Tobin told Mulcahy one of “our boys” killed Wilson, Mulcahy was horrified and determined to resign. Tobin told Collins about Mulcahy’s reaction and Collins sorted things out.

Mulcahy’s reaction either reveals a. he didn’t know that Wilson was ever going to be assassinated or b. he knew Wilson’s assassination was discussed but assumed no one was actually going to kill Wilson because the northern offensive wasn’t basically abandoned by himself and Collins or c. he know about the potential for Wilson’s assassination and was horrified that Collins gave the order without telling him and his offer to resign was as much an act of frustration that there were things Collins still wasn’t telling him, even if those orders could jeopardize the Irish Free State. And, even if Collins didn’t give the actual order, the fact that anti-treaty IRA men were acting out on “proposed” orders that could be traced back to Collins and the Provisional Government should have been troubling for the Provisional Government. Maybe it was for Mulcahy and, again, that’s why he offered to resign. We may never know whether Collins was involved with the assassination or not. What we do know, is that it was the final straw for the British.

After the assassination, Lloyd George sent a letter to the Provisional Government, stating:

“the ambiguous position of the Irish Republican Army can no longer be ignored by the British Government. Still less can Mr. Rory O’Connor be permitted to remain with his followers and his arsenal in open rebellion in the heart of Dublin…organizing and sending out from this centre enterprises of murder not only in the area of your Government but also in the Six Northern Counties and in Great Britain…His Majesty’s Government cannot consent to a continuance of this state of things.” – Charles Townshend, the Republic, pg. 405

The Provisional Government never responded to the letter and Lloyd George ordered General MacCready to clear the Fourt Courts of the anti-treaty IRA. MacCready, maybe the only English person with a lick of common sense at the time, argued against these orders, stating that the Cabinet’s “ignorance of the Irish situation blinded them to possible results.” (Charles Townshend, the Republic, pg. 405).

A Kidnapping Sparks an Artillery Bombardment

            Griffith, Eamon Dalton, and MacCready were in the midst of negotiations regarding weapons in case the Provisional Government needed to clear the courts out, but the government was still hesitant. Understandably, if the Provisional Government was going to shot at their own people, they wanted it to be on their own terms, not because the British Cabinet was upset about one of their own (and someone helping the Ulster government retain Protestant dominance in Northern Ireland) was assassinated.

            The anti-treaty IRA gave the Provisional Government the perfect excuse when they kidnapped Pro-treaty office J. J. “Ginger” O’Connell. They kidnapped him because one of their own members had been arrested earlier while carrying out a raid against a company that had goods from Northern Ireland.

On June 28^th, the Provisional Government sent a warning to the garrison in the Four Courts. They needed to surrender their arms and O’Connell and evacuate the courts or military action would be taken. Griffith told Mulcahy to take the courts and he gave overall command to Emmet Dalton. Dalton was a World War I veteran with real combat experience. He knew that he could not take the Fourt Courts with a direct assault with the troops he had and he also knew how terrifying an artillery bombardment can be even for veterans. Dalton’s plan was to use the artillery Britain gave to the Provisional Government to terrify and bombard the anti-treaty IRA forces into submission. The first cannon fired during the early morning hours on June 28^th.

References

The Politics of the Irish Civil War by Bill Kissane

The Republic by Charles Townshend

Richard Mulcahy: From the Politics of War to the Politics of Peace, 1913-1924 by Padraig O Caoimh

Liam Lynch: To Declare a Republic by Gerard Shannon

The Battle of the Four Courts: the First Three Days of the Irish Civil War by Michael Fewer