Formation of the Civic Guard

Collins put together a committee led by Eamon Duggan to solve the policing problem. Duggan’s father was a member of the RIC, fought in Easter Rising, briefly served as director of intelligence, and traveled to London with Collins, Griffith, and the others to negotiate with David Lloyd George. Collins filled the commission with people he trusted, including two former RIC district inspectors, Patrick Walsh and John A. Kearney. Despite being former RIC men, Collins knew they were loyal during the Irish War of Independence. The Dublin Metropolitan Police was represented by former Detective Sergeant Edward Broy, one of Collins’ trusted spies who helped him with some of his more spectacular intelligence gathering operations. Originally, Mulcahy was going to be the chairman, but since he was a little busy with negotiating with the anti-treaty IRA and building an the Free State Army, the chairman position went to Michael Staines.

Michael Staines held various key positions during the Irish War of Independence and was close with Collins. His father had been an RIC officer He served as a member of the IRB council during Easter Rising, served in the Dail, and organized the Belfast Boycott. The boycott was meant to prove that Northern Ireland relied on the rest of Ireland for its wealth and, thus, it made sense to keep the island united. Instead, it solidified the divide between north and south. Upon taking the position, Michael Collins told Staines that the RIC would disband on February 20^th, 1922 – giving him just three weeks to pull together a proposal. Staines organized the committee into various sub-committees and submitted their proposal to the Provisional Government on February 17, 1922. The proposal was basically to recreate the RIC under a different name. The force would consist of 4,300 men armed with Webley revolvers. They were organized and trained following the RIC textbook.

            Predictably, the compressed timeline forced the committee members to compromise and rely on old patterns. Collins loaded the committee with men he trusted and hand-picked former RIC and DMP men.  These men saw their appointment as a “reward” for their loyal service and, such, they felt they had a right to pick the top positions within the Civic Guard for themselves. Staines, not having enough time or, quite frankly, the creativity, relied on the ex-RIC and DMP members of the committee and, in turn, they relied on what was the familiar to them. Finally, the committee decided that old IRA men would get first preference in terms of position within the guard and former RIC and DMP men had to be vouched by IRA members. However, the former RICs and DMP men’s pay with the Civic Guard would be reflective of their policing experience and former pay. So, even though IRA men were given priority when it came to being selected, the men with RIC and DMP experience would be paid higher. The committee gravely underestimated how this payment system would further deteriorate the already tension relationship between IRA men and the RICs.

The Provisional Government approved the recommendation and empowered Staines to start recruiting four days after receiving the proposal. However, Staines could not recruit publicly because the Provisional Government was worried that would encounter the anti-treaty forces, so Staines secretly reached out to local IRA brigade commanders, asking them to recommend potential candidates. During the initial recruitment period, a total of 1,250 men joined the Civic Guard. 94% were former IRA members, the remaining 6% were RIC or DMP members, many whom resigned from those organizations during the Irish War of Independence and joined the IRA.

Staines was officially appointed commissioner of the Civic Guards on March 11, 1922. He had not been consulted about the appointment and he only intended to hold the role for three months. Sean Liddy and Patrick Brennan served as his senior officers. In March, Brennan was in charge of supervising a recruiting team and noted the difficulty in recruiting former IRA men because of anti-treaty IRA interference and resentment. Brennan reports:

“We got appointment officers in Clare, Galway, and other counties. In various counties like Cork, Kerry, Mayo, we could not get appointment officers, or if we sent them, they were arrested.” – Brian McCarthy, The Civic Guard Mutiny, pg. 63

In March, the Provisional Government appointed six former-RIC instructors as advisors to the Civic Guard, increasing tensions and mistrust among the recruits. The men expressed their displeasure by refusing to salute the former RIC officers and Liddy reported that many Civic Guard recruits:

“regarded the RIC as their most bitter antagonists and it little mattered to them if the whole Provisional Government, or any individual members of it, thought they owed a debt of gratitude to certain individuals of that now defunct and disbanded force.” – Brian McCarthy, The Civic Guard Mutiny, pg. 64

The Protest Committee

The Provisional Government was desperate to create an effective police force and quickly so they could relieve the growing National Army of maintaining law and order as a civil war became ever more likely. To achieve this goal, the Provisional Government reached out to men like former RIC District Inspector John Kearney to serve as Staines’ second in command. Kearny was the head constable responsible for arresting Roger Casement.

14 former IRA members of the Civic Guard organized a 14 men committee to protest the appointment of Kearney. They asked Brennan to forward the following petition to the Provisional Government:

            “…we have competent IRA Officers here that are in every way capable of training us in any way that we may require since they trained us to fight the common enemy, England, under terrible difficulties, and I may also add to fight the majority of the RIC.

            That members of the late RIC and DMP must not be allowed to cater for us in the cook-houses or an any way have authority whatsoever over us in future.

            That members of the late RIC and DMP must not be supplied with better sleeping accommodation or better good than what we have.

            “That ex-IRC and ex-DMP should not retain their rank and service attained during the rule of the Saxon while there are IRA men here that have given four and five years’ service free to their country and they are quite satisfied to loose [sic] both rank and service.

            That all recruiting for the Irish Civic Guard must be from the ranks of the IRA first as stated in the Irish Independent 7^th, inst, and that under no circumstances will we tolerate the disbanded RIC in here that bore arms for the enemy up to the present day to suppress the National instinct of the Irish people.

            That we are satisfied to work with ex-RIC that resigned on principle and proved the sincerity of their principle by taking up their arms and fought with their brothers for the common cause, provided that such members can tell us what and where they fought and who was their O/C.

            That we know several members of the IRA that were in active service during the war and who are both physically and mentally fit for the Civic Guard if it was worked on a proper basis.

            That since we came into this Depot our very best friends refuse to recognize us since we degraded ourselves so much as to be associated with such dreadful characters as the RIC.” – Brian McCarthy, the Civic Guard Mutiny, pg. 69

Even though Brennan assured the men he would forward their demands, he didn’t. He felt that it was an internal squabble and paranoia that would blow over. He assured the men that the appointment of Kearney and other former RIC officers were only temporary. He then reported the demands to Staines. Staines responded by promoting Brennan, who the protestors seemed to trust, to the rank of Assistant Commissioner, placing him just below Staines and the deputy commissioner in rank. He also told Kearney there was no way he could offer him a position in the guard and so Kearney and his family relocated to England. He also agreed to reach out to the protestors and consider their list of “approved” officers. He found them wanting and argued that he couldn’t train a police force without:

            “The assistance of some kind of police. There were a number of things such as execution of warrants, inquests, and other things that the RIC were accustomed to deal with.” – Brian McCarthy, the Civic Guard Mutiny, pg. 77

            With the number of guard members increasing to 1000 in April, Staines needed a deputy commissioner to help him organize and train the men. The Provisional Government appointed former RIC District Inspector Patrick Walsh. He immediately organized the men into eight companies and implemented a strict timetable of drills and classes. However, the training regime was the same as the RIC’s training regime, angering officers like Liddy and Brennan. Liddy would later blame Staines for allowing Walsh to recreate the RIC and for allowing Collins to interfere with appointments to the guards, often to the benefit of his allies or former Squad members.

Liddy may have been disappointed in Staines, but Staines was very angry with his other senior officer, Brennan. Staines believed that Brennan wasn’t being polite enough to the former RIC colleagues and accused him of encouraging tensions between the former IRA members and the former RIC officers. This accusation was based on Brennan’s insistence on eating in a different apartment, instead of the officer’s mess hall because non-commissioned officers (like Walsh) were using the officer’s mess hall which went against regulation. Brennan admitted this could create the perspective that he refused to eat with the former RIC officers, but in reality he was just upholding regulations. He claimed that he didn’t know that Walsh was a deputy commissioner and if he had known, he wouldn’t have complained, while Walsh said he didn’t care where he got his meals.

Brennan committed another faux pau when he refused to dine with Staines, Arthur Griffith and his wife and children, and Eamon Duggan and his wife. Brennan claims he refused to eat because he thought only ex-RIC officers were invited to the dinner and that the former-IRA officers were purposely excluded, which made him quite angry. He later admitted he “misread” the situation.

These small misunderstandings may seem innocent to us, but in the tense situation in Kildare Barracks, these kind of disagreements could turn into raging infernos.

Anti-Treaty Response

As any insurgent will tell you, chaos is an insurgent’s best friend. If a government cannot form simple organizations of control, like a police force, they will not be able to organize a proper response to the insurgent’s attacks, lowering the citizen’s trust in their government, and making them more likely to look for an alternative. The anti-treaty forces often took potshots at the members of the Civic Guard whenever they could and tracked down and either intimidated or killed recruits. Then Rory O’Connor took the Four Courts and an anti-treaty IRA officer Thomas Daly, joined the Civic Guard in order to undermine it.

Using the help of a clueless Patrick Sellars, Daly worked his way onto the protest committee. Sellars had no idea that Daly was in charge of a small number of anti-treaty officers and was in contact with O’Connor, awaiting instructions from the Fourt Courts.

1,100 Guard recruits, along with 200 rifles and 1,000 revolvers, relocated to the Kildare Artillery Barracks on April 25, 1922. When they arrived, they had to clean out the barracks since the British used it as a stable and the officers couldn’t find a safe place to turn into an armory. It was estimated that a few days later at least 400 revolvers and a large amount of ammunition went missing. A general parade was called and officers insisted on the return of the revolvers. All but ten were recovered.

In May, it was announced that a majority of the 12 open high commissioned ranks would be filled by former RIC men. Needless to say, this infuriated many of the former IRA members of the guard. Capitalizing on this anger, Daly organized a new protest committee, each company appointing 2 of their own officers to the committee. Only one company refused to take part.  On May 12^th, Daly and the new Protest Committee passed around a petition demanding “the removal of the Black and Tans from the camp”, even though no one in the barracks was a former Black and Tan member.

Mutiny

The Mutiny started on May 15^th, during a training session when Daly and Sellars submitted an ultimatum to Staines. The ultimatum included four key points:

1. They objected to the five former RIC men who held high office in the Civic Guard.
2. They objected to the “excessive” influence the five men had over the commissioner.
3. They objected to the current training program, believing it was shaping the Guard into a new RIC.
4. They wanted the following officers expulsed; despite the support they provided the IRA during the Irish War of Independence:
   1.  Deputy Commissioner Patrick Walsh
   1. Private Secretary Jeremiah Maher
   1. Superintendent Edmond Prendiville
   1. Superintendent James Brennan
   1. Superintendent Bernard O’Connor

Staines responded to the ultimatum by calling a General Parade at 2pm that day. He waited thirty minutes after the men assembled to appear and addressed the men. He claimed that:

“it was apparent at once that some secret agitation had been fomented and that what should have been a disciplined force was in the process of being converted into an unruly mob…It was at once apparent that some secret propaganda had been at work and that the unthinking men were being led away by some unscrupulous agency.” – Brian McCarthy, the Civic Guard Mutiny, pg. 93

He defended the records of the men the committee wanted expulsed. He called each signatory of the ultimatum and had them stand in the center of the square and read their registration numbers. He asked the men if the matter was now close and they could return to business at hand, but the leaders of the commission refused to step back in line. Staines told them to send in their resignation and asked the men if they would stand by him or the committee. The men heckled him and broke ranks to stand with the protest committee. Staines claimed that the men were little more than a “pack of hooligans” and dismissed the parade. As he retreated, Staines heard the men cry, “We’ll stand by Paddy Brennan”, convincing him that Brennan was somehow involved in the mutiny. It didn’t help that Brennan didn’t return from leave the day of the mutiny. He claimed that he had been staying with his sick mother and stayed the night per her request. He also denied having anything to do with the mutiny and that the men calling his name must have been a spur of the moment thing. Chief Superintendent Michael Ring stayed with the men and successfully calmed them down and even won their loyalty, including the men who made up the commission. Ring asked them to reconsider the ultimatum but two men, O’Meara and Healy, became agitated and asked for the expulsion of five former RIC officers. Ring claimed that he used information provided by loyal RIC members. O’Meara claimed then Ring didn’t fight straight and Ring replied, “if I didn’t fight straight, my bullets went straight.”

Ring eventually dismissed the parade and called on the committee members to remain to discuss matters further. Ring told them to submit a formal request and he would do his best to argue their case. The protest committee agreed to discuss the matter with the men and Ring told them Staines would leave in the morning to report the situation to government and asked them “not to do anything drastic” while Staines was away.

As the parties separated a group of 100 upset recruits raided the armory, stealing 167 rifles and 243 revolvers from the stockpile of 200 rifles and 1,000 revolvers. Worried about their safety, Staines and the headquarters staff were protected by a special armed guard as a precautionary measure.

The next day, May 16^th, Staines ordered that company 6, the only “disciplined” company be sent to a vacant barracks at Newbridge, to separate them from the mutineers. However, the protest committee got to the men of company 6 first and prevented the transfer. Staines ordered Superintendent John Joseph Byrne to request military aid from the National Army. He and Walsh also wrote their resignations before traveling to Dublin. Staines explained his decisions as:

“the situation was impossible, and that the men allowed themselves to be influenced by a number of their comrades who were not amenable to reason, I left the Depot and came to Dublin and reported the matter to the Provisional Government.” – Brian McCarthy, the Civic Guard Mutiny, pg. 98

The government presented their own solution to the men’s issues to Sellars and Daly. The solution included the request that the men write all of their complaints in writing restore the status quo in camp. Once these two conditions were met, the government would set up a national inquiry into the matter. Sellars and Daly returned to camp to discuss the government’s terms to the other men and Collins ordered Staines to return and assert his authority in the camp.

While negotiations occurred in Dublin, military reinforcements from the neighboring camp, Curragh arrived in Kildare to find the arsenal emptied and distributed to the mutineers and Chief Superintendent Michael Ring arguing with the rebel leaders over who truly controlled the barracks. Despite the complicated situation, the National Army and the Civic Guard did not fire at one another. Instead, the National Army returned to Curragh and the mutiny was left to resolve itself. Brennan finally returned later that night and organized for the high-ranking officers to leave the camp and head towards Curragh Barracks. Staines, Daly, and Sellars returned to the barracks at 10:30pm only for Staines to be refused entry. Sellars and Daly supported this decision while Brennan argued that Staines was still the Commandant and should be let in. Staines eventually returned to Dublin and Brennan would later claim he never knew his orders had not been followed.

On May 17^th, the Committee drafted a new set of orders, naming Brennan as the new Commissioner, and declaring their loyalty to the Civic Guard, the Provisional Government, and the Dail Eireann. Brennan claimed that he had never been consulted about his sudden promotion.

On May 18^th, the Committee, predictably rejected the Government’s ultimatum, sending Brennan as their spokesperson. According to Brennan he asked Staines to return to the barracks ten times, but Staines refused, claiming he had resigned from the Guard. The government repeated that if the mutineers had concerns about the Guard, they would have to put in a formal request and an enquiry would be formed.

Member of the commission grew frustrated with the stalemate and left the committee, leaving Daly and his fellow anti-treaty supports to fill in the power vacuum the others left behind. Ring and other men loyal to Staines and the Provisional Government locked themselves in Ring’s quarters and prepared for an ambush. The mutineers tried to enter Ring’s room and when they couldn’t break in, they prevented food from being delivered to their room and prevented all communications between Ring and Staines. An officer escaped the barracks and reported to Staines and an agreement was made where Ring and the other officers could leave.

Sellars and Daly wrote a new request to the government, claiming that the government could ignore their previous demand, instead it was more of an ‘informal’ request’. However, they would only be willing to negotiate with the government if their request was met.

            Brennan brought the new request to Collins and Duggan and Collins was furious. Matters were made worse when Staines claimed that Brennan was involved with the mutiny, which Brennan refuted. The meeting ended in a shouting match and Brennan returned to the barracks fearing government action.  

            That night, Sellars and Daly wrote to Duggan stating:

            “…we hereby hand over the Headquarters and Depot of the Civic Guard to the Senior Officer here at present: Co. Commdt P. Brennan. We formally withdraw the word demand on original document and respectfully request the Minister for Home Affairs to have the grievances of the men inquired into as soon as possible. In the future we shall have our lawful grievances put forward in the proper manner.” – Brian McCarthy, The Civic Guard Mutiny, pg. 110

Brennan formally accepted command of the barracks and reminded the men to remain loyal to the Provisional Government while this mess was sorted out.

Michael Collins paid a visit to the barracks on May 26^th. He met with Brennan first and asked if he should meet with the committee first or the all the men. Brennan told him to speak to the Commission first and to do his best to placate them. The negotiations between Collins and the Commission was heated, but they eventually agreed to a return to the status quo and would allow Staines and the others to return to the Barracks. Collins then addressed the rest of the men and expressed his disappointment, criticized the leaders of the mutiny for their “rash” behavior, told the men that any complaints delivered through the proper channels would be looked in, and that the police force required the highest level of discipline than any other field of service.

Even though an agreement was reached, the men in the barracks grew impatient when Staines and the others didn’t return. They were ordered to return the arms stolen from the armory, but a majority of weapons were still unaccounted for.

The reason Staines didn’t return to the Kildare Barracks was because he was recruiting a new Civic Guard in Dublin, claiming different warehouses to use as training facilities. A reporter caught wind of the story and published an article on May 22^nd, arguing the men in Kildare. To make matters more chaotic, some of the men who joined Staines’ Dublin Guard defected to the Kildare mutineers. While the new recruits infused the mutiny with new blood, the men had not been paid since early May and they claimed Collins was purposely withholding their pay. Staines argued that he never received completed pay stubs.

Sellars and Daly traveled back to Dublin to complain about the new Civic Guard and the delay in establishing an enquiry. They also demanded to be paid. Staines and Collins agreed to pay the men once Walsh and five other men performed a stocktake of the whole barracks. Staines and his other officers arrived in front of Kildare Barracks on June 9^th, but were denied access. Staines demanded to see Brennan, but Brennan wasn’t in the Barracks. He was out to attend an anniversary for one of his former comrades in East Clare. Daly, Sellars, and Sergeant Sean O’Brien approached the gate and complained about the number of men Staines brought with him. They claimed that he broke the agreement, but Staines argued that he would never have agreed to be only five men with him. He claimed that Collins told him, “Bring down as many as you need, we will leave it to yourself.” – Brian McCarthy, The Civic Guard Mutiny, pg 118.

After much arguing, Staines returned to Dublin once more and complained that Brennan was a liar. Discipline was non-existent in the barracks and the committee was in full control, not Brennan.

General Elections and the Mutiny

Collins’ Sinn Fein party won a majority of seats in the Dail Eireann during the general elections, forcing the hands of the anti-treaty IRA. At 11p.m. Daly and his fellow committee members took a number of rifles, revolvers, and ammunition and took three tenders and a Ford car. Lynch, a loyal Civic Guard officer, was suspicious about the late night call for cars and so he joined Daly on his journey. Daly took him to his rendezvous location with Rory O’Connor. O’Connor tried to talk Lynch into joining the anti-treaty side, but Lynch was unmoved. His revolver was taken officially making him a prisoner of the anti-treaty army. Daly returned to Kildare Barracks with anti-Treaty soldiers who cleaned out the Kildare Armory. An officer saw Daly and the other soldiers when he expected to see Lynch with Daly. He reported the situation to Brennan, expressing his concerns that Lynch was a prisoner and Brennan told him not to worry about it until the morning.

            Daly took the convoy with the weapons back to the cottage he was holding Lynch in. he told Lynch to stay in the cottage for an hour. Once the hour passed, he could leave. Lynch waited fifteen minutes before returning to Kildare while Daly took the weapons to the Four Courts.

Collins and Duggan returned to Kildare Barracks to negotiate with the mutineers one final time. The mutineers issued a statement, explaining their reasons for rebelling, distancing themselves from the anti-treaty elements of the mutiny, and criticized the government for relying on the RIC to train the Civic Guard. They ended their statement by declaring loyalty to the people and the democratically elected government of Ireland. The government responded by promising to pay the men of Kildare Barracks and suspend the Kildare recruits until an enquiry could be held. Staines returned to Kildare Barracks on June 27^th to arrange the necessary pay sheets for the men, but his efforts were hampered by the bombardment of the Four Courts.

            The men of Kildare Barracks waited for two weeks as the government assaulted the Four Courts and entered a civil war. The men grew anxious and Brennan wrote to Collins on July 7^th, claiming that the men were eager to be of service and many were willing to temporarily transfer to the national army to help fight the insurgents. Collins wrote back thanking him for the gesture of loyalty and the best service the men could provide the state was to become efficient policemen.

Formation of a Police Force, Take 2

The enquiry finally started on July 12^th. Legal Secretary Kevin O’Shiel and Michael McAuliffe of the Labour Department went to Kildare Barracks to

“Constitute a commission to investigate and report to the Provisional Government as to the breaches of discipline and acts of insubordination alleged to have been committed recently by, and the complains made on the part of, members of the Civic Guard” – Brian McCarthy, The Civic Guard Mutiny, pg. 139

They were also instructed to provide any recommendations they had on the future structure of the Civic Guard. The creation of this commission was Collins’ last act as Chairman of the Provisional Government. He took the position of Commander-in-Chief of the National Army once the civil war started and William Cosgrave stepped in as Chairman. He kept Collins informed as the commission submitted its findings.

O’Shiel and McAuliffe opened the investigation on July 13^th and ran into a speed bump on day one. Staines arrived to the commission prepared with witnesses, but there was no one to speak for the Civic Guard. Brennan refused to submit a list because he was “neutral” and he claimed the men had no list of witnesses because they didn’t know the commission was meeting that day nor did they know what the commission would cover. Staines grew exasperated and Brennan finally agreed to tell the men that they would need to submit a list of witnesses and advocate for themselves. O’Shiel adjourned the commission until the next day and told Brennan to make sure that the notice of sitting times of the commission be placed on the Kildare and Newbridge Barracks notice boards.

 The commission reopened on July 14^th. Deputy Commissioner Walsh represented Staines and Guard John O’Connell represented the Civic Guard. Staines’ statement defended many of his decisions based on the need for expediency and lack of police experience amongst the members of the IRA. He also blamed Brennan for not supporting him properly. He even claimed that Brennan knew of the mutiny beforehand and that’s why he was missing on May 15^th and purposely “disappeared” on June 9^th so Staines and his men would be refused entrance into the barracks per the agreement between the mutineers and the Irish Government. After O’Connell cross-examined Staines, Walsh called Barrack Master Mathias McCarthy to testify to the theft of Civic Guard arms and Commandant Ring to provide further information on what happened on May 15^th.

Walsh sat as a witness the next day, July 15^th, and argued that Collins himself asked Walsh to help Staines create the Civic Guard. O’Connell took the stand next and read a prepared statement that hadn’t been signed by anyone, but the commission accepted as representatives of the mutineers. It repeated the men’s concerns about having RIC officers involved in created an Irish police force, their fears about serving in the RIC under a different name, and blamed Staines for boorishly mishandling a delicate situation, exasperating mistrust and anger. As the statement tries to dismantle the government’s rationale of needing experienced policemen to create a police force, the author sounds almost offended:

“We have ideas of our own, and we wish to develop and apply them, within reason, unfettered by RIC Rules and Codes and Regulations. To keep the peace, and to enforce law and order in this Nation, it will be obligatory on us to be bone of the bone of the people and flesh of their flesh, and mind of their mind. Otherwise, we shall be, from the outset, suspected by them, in time we shall be distrusted, and eventually, we shall be ostracized and hated.” – Brian McCarthy, the Civic Guard Mutiny, pg. 151

They ended their statement by admitting that they had been undisciplined in their efforts, but not wrong, they distanced themselves from Daly, and professed their loyalty to the Irish government and its people. Stellars and Liddy spoke next in defense of the men, admitting that the actions of the men were undisciplined and extreme, but justifiable considering the circumstances. Liddy also acknowledged that Rings’ decision to stand by the commandant was probably the “proper” stance to take. Guard John O’Meara and Sergeant Patrick Doyle spoke next. Through his cross-examination, Walsh proved that the men didn’t have a firm or unified idea of who qualified as an “unacceptable” ex-RIC officer and who didn’t. As McAuliffe put it:

“they [the Men] simply took things more or less into their own hands. You will agree is is an obviously unfair thing to accuse men and take a certain line of action against them – men like Superintendent Meagher (Maher), who it transpires, has a very good national record” – Brian McCarthy, The Civic Guard Mutiny, pg. 158

Two of O’Connell’s witnesses, Sergeant Patrick Coy and Sergeant McNamara refused to answer Walsh’s questions because he was a former DI for the RIC, ignoring his nationalistic record during the war of independence. Losing patience, O’Shiel and McAuliffe closed the commission given the obstinance of O’Connell’s own witnesses. O’Shiel traveled to Dublin that night and reported to the government:

“there is a state of grave insubordination and lack of discipline among the men, that, as at present, the Civic Guard could not, in his opinion, be organized into a competent Police Force. In the circumstances, it was not now possible to utilize the Civic Guard for Police duties in certain areas, as suggested by the commander-in-chief in his letter.” – Brian McCarthy, The Civic Guard Mutiny, pg. 162

Brennan (who predictably had been elsewhere during the first two days of the commission) complained to Collins that he had not had a chance to defend himself. O’Shiel and McAuliffe held a special commission for Brennan on July 21^st. Brennan didn’t know this, but his fate had already been decided. Cosgrave wrote to Collins arguing that no matter the outcome of the special commission, it would be best if:

“Mr. P. Brennan might be transferred to other work. Military Governors for Jails will be required, and as well, as officers to meet the wounded at Railway terminals” – Brian McCarthy, The Civic Guard Mutiny, pg. 163

The special commission finished on July 22^nd and it was now up to O’Shiels and McAuliffe to provide a report to the Provisional Government. The report was submitted on August 17^th, five days after the death of President Arthur Griffith. O’Shiel and McAuliffe agreed with Staines on all nine of his complaints and agreed that Brennan’s decision to remain in the barracks and engage with the mutineers only make matters worse. However, the report criticized Staines for leaving the barracks and for forcing the men to choose a side on a parade field. They also wrote that arming the Civic Guard was a terrible idea as it created a militant force and allowed men to settle grievances through their own means. It basically just continued the mindset of a soldier and not a police officer. While the report sympathized with the men’s fears about the resurrection of the RIC, it argued that the main source of discontentment was external propaganda and internal sabotage by the anti-treaty forces. They also wrote that all former RIC officers who joined the Civic Guard had either quit the RIC to join the IRA or remained within the RIC because they were ordered to by IRA officers. They recommended the disbandment of the Civic Guard but expressed no reasons to prevent former Civic Guard members from enrolling in the new police force. They would have to receive approval from a three-man selection committee to do so.

A New Police Force

The report recommended that the new police force consist of:

1. The advice of experienced police officers from America, France, and Germany for a three-to-five-year period. The government should also retain Patrick Walsh in a non-commissioned position to help with the training.
2. Elected and former elected officials could not serve in the new police force
3. All volunteers would be kept on for a probation period of one year so their character and their loyalty could be assessed. During this period, the volunteers would be encouraged to study for the rank they wanted to expedite training and keep the men occupied.
4. Only ex-IRA men could serve in the most senior positions of HQ while each officer’s chief assistance should be an ex-RIC or DMP. That way they can combat then anti-treaty’s propaganda but also benefit from the former police officer’s experience.
5. The new police force would be divided into three different sections:
   1. The unarmed main body that would be deployed all over the country. They were the primary sources of peacekeeping. Their lack of weapons were expected to win over the people and dissuade the anti-treaty forces from attacking them.
   1. A smaller armed, reserve force under direct command of the commissioner. This force would be deployed in absolute emergencies.
   1. A liaison department that would manage relations between the local council authorities and the new police force to manage the deployment of the armed reserves.
   1. They also recommended the creation of a detective force, but it would be under the joint control of the commissioner for the new police force and the commissioner of the DMP.
6. There should be a policing journal where policing knowledge could be shared while also encouraging literacy and study within the police force.
7. A review of the salaries for the new police force so the government could avoid a situation where they were bribing men to remain loyal.
8. The following clause added to the existing oath of loyalty: To obey the orders of all superior officers appointed by the elected Government of the people of Ireland.

The Provisional Government read the Commission’s recommendations and agreed to:

1. Share the report confidentially with Commissioner Staines
2. Ask Staines to resign since he was a democratically elected official and, thus, couldn’t serve in the Civic Guard
3. Appoint Commandant Sean O’ Muirthile as Commissioner
4. Deal with Brennan and Liddy
5. Technically disband the Civic Guard, but not to disperse them
6. Arrange for the select re-enrolment of members of the Civic Guard
7. Send the new Civic Guard on police duty ASAP

Then Collins died and someone shared a confidential document revealing that the RIC men who disbanded with the force, instead of resigning to join the IRA, received high pensions and salaries, far higher than the former ex-RIC officers who resigned and the former IRA members of the Civic Guard. Cosgrave immediately implemented the Commissions’ recommendations, formally disbanding the Civic Guard, and created a new police force under the command of fascist Eoin O’Duffy. Makes sense a fascist would be a pig.

 O’Duffy won the respect of the new police force and effectively implemented the commissions’ recommendations. Even if the men were still upset about the entire affair, they didn’t have time to take action as the Provisional Government was determined to establish control over the entire country. The first batch of unarmed officers were sent into the Irish countryside during the last two weeks of September. Before they left O’Duffy gathered them on the parade grounds and told them:

“You are going out unarmed into a hostile area. You are the first to be sent out. You may be murdered, your barracks burned, your uniform taken off you, but you must carry on and bring peace to the people.” – Brian McCarthy, the Civic Guard Mutiny, pg. 197

About 1,700 police officers took their place around the country between September and October 1922. In many cases they were intimidated and harassed by the anti-treaty forces. Their possessions stolen, their lives threatened, and their barracks attacked and/or raided, but most of the men refused to flee or quit the force. As the National Army withdrew from barracks throughout the country and forced on truly military affairs, the new police force frantically increased their recruiting efforts. Of course, this led to hardly any time to train the new recruits and there were many farcical incidents where police officers would try to perform their duties but didn’t understand police procedure, so they’d arrest someone but wouldn’t know how to process them, etc.

 As the Civil War wound to an end, O’Duffy was able to address the newly named Garda Siochana’s lack of training. He implemented required exams, relied on Walsh’s expertise to establish an effective training regime, and created the Garda’s own magazine: Iris an Gharda. In the first issue, O’Higgins addressed the guards:

“The internal politics and political controversies of the country are not your concern. You will serve, with the same imperturbable discipline and with increasing efficiency, any Executive which has the support of the majority of the people’s elected representatives. Party will, no doubt, succeed party in the ebb and flow of the political tide. New issues will arise to convulse the Nation. The landmarks of today will disappear. You will remain steadfast and devoted in the service of the people and of any Executive which it may please the people to return to power. That is the real meaning of Democracy ­­– Government of the people by the people through their elected representatives. It is the only barrier between mankind and anarchy.” – Brian McCarthy, The Civic Guard Mutiny, pg. 205

References

The Civic Guard Mutiny by Brian McCarthy

The Foundational Legislation of the Garda Siochana (1922-1926) by Aengus Fallon