The Unraveling of Kolchak

When Kolchak took over, his staff was optimistic that they would easily defeat the Bolsheviks, and at first it looked like they were right? Kolchak launched his spring offensive in March 1919 and despite not properly coordinating his offensive with Denikin’s forces in the south, he enjoyed considerable success.

His battle plan was to launch an assault along his entire front with forces concentrated on the center through Ufa toward the middle of the Volga with a direct route to the Moscow. His forces considered of three armies: Gajda’s Siberian army of 45,000 men plus the Siberian Flotilla, General Khanzhin’s Western Army of 42,000 men, and the Dutov’s Orenburg and Urals forces consisting of 20,000 Cossacks.

He was facing the 2^nd, 5^th, 1^st, and 4^th armies consisting of 120,000 men plus the Volga-Kama military flotilla. Additionally, the Red Armies were able to receive reinforcements and supplies easier and faster than the White Armies.

Kolchak’s opening offensive pushed the Red armies to the Volga and Orenburg, but ran into supply and communication issues with the spring thaw. Additionally, their forces were spread across a 180,000 square mile territory that they now had to manage. The Red Armies received reinforcements in April and launched a new offensive in May. General Mikhail Frunze took advance of the White overreach and attacked the Western army, pushing it back to Ufa and exposing the Siberian Army’s flank. Frunze pushed his advantage and by Kolchak’s forces had been pushed beyond their point of departure by July.

The intrigue going on within Kolchak’s staff is beyond this podcast, but these defeats were made worse by a revolving door of generals and staff members plus mass desertion within the ranks. Kolchak reorganized his army in mid-summer and tried to engulf the Red army in a pincer move, but it failed because of poor coordination. This defeat was the final nail in the coffin for the allies who convinced Kolchak to be a lost cause. Despite this, Kolchak launched another failed offense in September.

By November Kolchak lost his headquarters in Omsk and was completely cut off from the Urals and Orenburg (where most of the Alash Orda were). Hundreds of men and generals fled, some heading towards the Caspian and then Persia and others fleeing towards Semirech’e and then Xinjiang. Those who remained with Kolchak undertook the Great Siberian Ice March heading towards Chita to unite with the Far Eastern (White) Army led by Ataman Semenov, who was known to be a tyrant and brute but supported by the Japanese. Those who disapproved of Semenov went into Manchuria. They used the Trans-Siberian Railroad as a guide, but were sometimes denied the use of the railroad by the Czechoslovak Legion. Again, this march is beyond this podcast, but as one can imagine, it was a nightmare for anyone who took part as they had to deal with Siberian winter, lack of supplies, and Red forces and various insurgents snapping at their heels. And they also had to cross the frozen Lake Baikal in sub-zero temperatures. Not fun.

Kolchak, himself, stepped down from command on January 4^th, 1920, giving command of South Russia to General Denikin and command of the Far East to Ataman Semenov. He was promised safe passage to the British military mission in Irkutsk, but was betrayed to the Bolsheviks by the Czech Legion. He was executed by a Cheka (precursor to the KGB) firing squad on the morning of Feb 7^th, 1920, and dumped into the frozen Angara River.

Up a Creek Without a Paddle

Where did this leave the Alash Orda? Well, they were up a creek without a paddle.

The Alash Orda rejected the Bolshevik overtures in 1918 because they refused to recognize Alash Autonomy and here they were, not even a year later, supporting an ally that just dissolved their own government. There were different opinions on what to do next. Some, like Baitursynov, traveled to Moscow to meet with Lenin and joined the Kirghiz Military-Revolutionary Committee with Stalin writing:

“I did not and do not consider him a revolutionary-communist or a sympathizer; nevertheless, his presence in the Revolutionary committee is necessary”

Dina A. Amanzholova, Kazakh Autonomy and Russia: the History of the Alash Movement, pg. 90

Others, like Bukeikhanov, stuck with the White Army, writing in February 1919 expressing a desire:

“of the Kirghiz, together with the valiant Siberian troops, to wage battle with the Bolsheviks, from whom the Kirghiz population suffered greatly in Semirech’e Oblast being completely destroyed by them.” He argued that the Kazakhs were “completely reliable, hardy material for the army, insusceptible to the Bolshevik infection”

Dina A. Amanzholova, Kazakh Autonomy and Russia: the History of the Alash Movement, pg. 68

He went ahead and formed cavalry units of Kazakh soldiers, similar to the Cossacks, who answered to Russian and Kazakh cadres. These soldiers would take part in all of Kolchak’s offenses in the Urals and were even praised for their efforts, one White officer writing:

“Dressed in our uniforms, with an orderly line of .375-caliber rifles thrown over their shoulder, in proper files they move, as if on parade, and give the impression of a genuine dashing cavalry.”

Dina A. Amanzholova, Kazakh Autonomy and Russia: the History of the Alash Movement, pg. 70

They were involved with some of the few victories the White Army experience during the summer such as the taking of the small Cherkasskoe garrison in August, but they could not stem the Red tide.

Instead, Kazakh forces in the Urals reached out the Red First Army in November, offering their services against the White Army. The Bolsheviks sensed an opportunity since the soldiers themselves “had no desire to bear the material and personal sacrifices, either for White Generals or for the Alash Orda leaders from the Kirghiz.” ( Dina A. Amanzholova, Kazakh Autonomy and Russia: the History of the Alash Movement, pg. 50)

From November 1919 onward, the Alash Orda army units in the Urals pursued a policy that:“consisted on the one hand of formal agreements on paper with the Cossacks and on the other in showing them as much passive resistance as was feasible” (Dina A. Amanzholova, Kazakh Autonomy and Russia: the History of the Alash Movement, pg. 51)

They offered to supply information and to support offensives against the White army. They wrote:

“The rapid destruction of the Urals front, in addition to liberating the Kirghiz from the violence of the Cossacks, has the vital significance that it opens up access to oil fields and therefore oil products, for which there is acute need in Soviet Russia. The liquidation of the Urals front, in addition, liberates the Astrakhan group, currently surrounded by the foe of all sides.”

Dina A. Amanzholova, Kazakh Autonomy and Russia: the History of the Alash Movement, pg. 53

The Red army, wanting to avoid violence at all costs, but wanted to neutralize all threatens in the region-even indigenous ones-demanded the:

“complete and total surrender of all weapons and other military property ought to be categorically demanded and, in the event of the surrender, must be immediately directed to the Dzhurun station for subsequent headquarters turnover.”

Dina A. Amanzholova, Kazakh Autonomy and Russia: the History of the Alash Movement, pg. 52

The Soviets wanted the Alash Orda to march their forces to the city of Uil and surrender there. The Alash refused since that march would leave their forces exposed to White retaliation. They wrote back:

“…the Urals front is not yet liquidated, and dozens of Kirghiz volosts still remain in the region of deployment of the Cossack troops. The Cossacks, embittered by our coming out on the side of Soviet power, have already begun to butcher our peaceful population. In addition to the southern volosts remaining within the confines of the deployment of Cossack units, as we have today received reliable information, individual Cossack detachments are lurking in the rear among us, perpetrating indescribable violence…We would consider it a crime to leave the population to the mercy of fate at such a moment and to set out with military units to Uil. We began and will continue the struggle against the Cossacks right on up until our oblast is finally cleansed of them. Upon finishing this operation, we can travel anywhere at all. We earnestly ask you to take all subsequent measures toward the most rapid liquidation of the Urals front…We likewise ask that the trophies acquired exclusively by the labors of our units be placed at the disposal of the Kirghiz revolutionary committee of Orenburg as items necessary for the Red Units formed.”

Dina A. Amanzholova, Kazakh Autonomy and Russia: the History of the Alash Movement, pg. 63

Frunze left the negotiations to the First Army, but provided a general program on how the surrender should be handled.

“In view of the intention expressed by the Western Sections of the Kirghiz government “Alash Orda” to surrender to the mercy and will of the Soviet government with all stocks of weapons and military supplies I order:

First. The Revolutionary council of the first or fourth army is to take on the leadership of the negotiations, depending on the location of detachments of Alash-Orda and their delegates.

Second. In the basis of the negotiations are to be laid (1) the Decree of the Council of People’s Commissars on the Urals Cossacks of 7 December (2) Order of the Turkestan Front to the Urals Cossacks of 9 December and the Order of the Turkestan Front to the Orenberg Cossacks.

Third. Negotiations are not to be dragged out, having appointed the shortest period possible for the surrender.

Fourth. The dzhigits, upon disarmament, are to be deployed in the nearest army rear, subjects to political processing, and subsequently used in the capacity of reinforcements for troops active in the region of the Kirghiz Steppes initially only in detachments of auxiliary designation.

Fifth. Members of the government and command team are to be deployed in Ural’sk or Orenburg environs to isolate communication with the Kirghiz Steppe.

Sixth. The Right is to be given to elect a delegation composed of no more than five people for a journey to staff headquarters, and subsequently to Moscow. Seventh. Observance of the precise fulfillment of all of our terms of surrender”

Dina A. Amanzholova, Kazakh Autonomy and Russia: the History of the Alash Movement, pg. 55

Frunze reported to Lenin on the same day, “the military significance of Alash-Orda is insignificant, but politically and economically their surrender is important, securing for us the entire steppe region to the shores of the Caspian” (Dina A. Amanzholova, Kazakh Autonomy and Russia: the History of the Alash Movement, pg. 55)

The Alash Orda rejected these demands, writing back:

“We believe that friends should meet one another with a salute, and not with the somber image…of the weak one bowing his head before the strong one. True democrats cannot and should not allow and permit themselves to humiliate others. If you nourish distrust toward us, we will prove to you the sincerity of our declaration in our actions, participating together with you in active struggle with common enemies-the Cossacks. For our population, the quickest possible expulsion of the Cossacks from the Kirghiz territories is of unquestionable and pressing interest, because every extra day that they stay here causes the population incalculable harm…After a brief welcome, your leaders will pass through the front of our troops, exchanging greetings with them, and we will pass through yours; after this unification from each side, two rank-and-file soldiers will move towards one another and greet and embrace one another, after which we can bring the units closer together and put them into whatever formation will be convenient, say a brief welcome, after which the troops will go wherever necessary…it would be appropriate to organize more ceremonially to make an impression on the morale of the population and of the fighters themselves. We await your help as soon as possible.”

Dina A. Amanzholova, Kazakh Autonomy and Russia: the History of the Alash Movement, pg. 56

Frunze wasn’t having any of it. He wrote back to the First Army:

“First. It is permitted, in conformity with the situation, not to insist on the immediate directing of all members of the Alash Orda government and of the command to Orenburg, having taken these several of the most authoritative persons only for communications and as hostages. Second. It is permitted to use immediately armed units of Alash Orda, having transformed them at your discretion and having secured hostages in the event of treachery. Third. Use the existing situation for the quickest possible fulfillment of this task of taking control of the oil fields region and cutting off paths of retreat to the East of the foe’s Ural Army units. Fourth. Impose as a duty on the former Kirghiz government the immediate formation in the region of Uil foodstuffs bases of transport necessary for the movement of units.”

Dina A. Amanzholova, Kazakh Autonomy and Russia: the History of the Alash Movement, pg. 59

Back in Semipalatinsk, the Alash Orda faced pressure from local non-Alash allied organizations and movements to ally with the Bolshevik to remain relevant. Frunze added to that pressure by taking Semipalatinsk on December 1^st after the local organizations led a local uprising.

On December 21^st, the Alash Orda published an official decree:

“In view of the fact that the rights of the peoples of Russia are most fully ensured by Soviet power, that the well-known declaration of the rights of peoples issued by the Council for People’s Commissars has been implemented with respect to many of the peoples of Soviet Russia and has been confirmed once again during the entry of Soviet troops onto the territory of Siberia in the Declaration of the chairmen of the Central Committee, the Council of People’s Commissars, the Oblast committee of Alash Orda resolves:

(1) to support Soviet power with all means and efforts, bearing freedom, equality, brotherhood, and light into all the unfortunate dark corners of many-language Russia, to welcome the appearance on Alash territory (the Kirghiz autonomy) of Soviet troops, as liberators from the tyranny of the reaction monarchistic dictatorship”

Dina A. Amanzholova, Kazakh Autonomy and Russia: the History of the Alash Movement, pg. 74

By end of December the Bolsheviks informed the Alash Orda that their proposal was unacceptable rejected and that:

“We do not know and do not recognize any Alash Orda government whatsoever and cannot enter into treaty agreements with them as such…the government is to be dissolved. The decree on amnesty remains in full force.”

Dina A. Amanzholova, Kazakh Autonomy and Russia: the History of the Alash Movement, pg. 60

The Alash Orda held onto hope that by demonstrating their value as military allies, they could remain political equals. So, on December 27^th, the Alash Orda launched an attack against Kyzyl-Kuga, capturing it and the Iletsk Corps staff HQ. The Cossacks tried to liberate Kyzyl-Kuga but were repulsed. The Alash Orda took prisoner the entire corps staff HQ, 500 Cossacks and officers, one artillery piece, fifteen machine guns, and many rifles. The First Army sent a reconnaissance detachment to Kyzyl-Kuga on December 29^th. The Alash Orda sent word of their victory to the Bolsheviks on January 5^th, 1920, claiming that “In such a manner, having participated actively in the struggle with the enemies of Soviet power in fact.” They argued that a merger of forces was natural “for in one krai, there cannot be two masters” (Dina A. Amanzholova, Kazakh Autonomy and Russia: the History of the Alash Movement, pg. 62)

The problem was the Bolsheviks didn’t know what to do with the Alash Orda. On the one hand they were local intelligentsia who could be put to good use in furthering the Bolshevik cause but on the other hand they were a nationalistic political movement that created its own government, rebuffed the Bolsheviks, and allied themselves with the White. In January, the Alash Orda and Bolsheviks met and agreed that until an All-Kirghiz Council could be convened to determine the future of the Kazakh people, the government of the Steppe would fall to the Revolutionary-Military Committee, which contains members of the Alash Orda such as Baitursynov and the military units would merge with the Third Tatar Strelets Regiment. On January 21^st this agreement was issued in a formal declaration:

“…only one resolution is possible. Until the All-Kirghiz Congress, to be convened this June and being the only body that can elect a lawful Soviet government of all of Kirghizia, the Kirghiz oblasts shall be administered by a Military Revolutionary Committee appointed by the Council of People’s Commissars of the RSFSR. For this reason, a merger of Alash Orda with the Revolutionary Committee is possible only when the Council of Peoples’ Commissars includes certain Alash Orda members in the composition of the Military-Revolutionary Committee of Kirghizia.”

Dina A. Amanzholova, Kazakh Autonomy and Russia: the History of the Alash Movement, pg. 65

And yet the Military-Revolutionary Committee decided not to appoint Alash Orda members to the committee because of their bourgeois backgrounds and distrust and dislike from other soviet Kazakhs. Instead, a commission was created to deal with property and trophies and by the spring and summer of 1920, the property, arms, and units of the Alash Orda were transferred into the disposition of the Kirghiz Military-revolutionary committee and army.

In February 1920, they arrested several Alash Orda members, sparking outrage from 800,000 people of the Kazakh oblast, the Kirghiz Revolutionary Committee, and the chair of the Bashkir Military-Revolutionary Committee, Z. Validov, who went all the way to Stalin and Lenin, begging them to issue a clear decree on the fates of the Alash Orda.

On March 9^th, 1920, the Kirghiz Military-Revolutionary Committee issued the following statement:

“1. Alash Orda calling itself a government, and the zemstvo institutions subordinated to it, shall be liquidated as not being prescribed by the Constitution of the RSFSR. All laws, instructions, and orders issued by it during its existence shall be considered invalid. All property and currency, arms, military munitions and equipment shall be subject to transfer to the corresponding commissariats and departments of the krai, oblast, and uezd revolutionary committees by ownership.

All employees shall fall under disposition of the corresponding commissariats and mobilized by their specialization and shall be maintained on special account of the commissariat of internal affairs.

2. The Spiritual Administration existing in Ural’sk Oblast (the Commission for the administration of spiritual affairs attached to the Western section of Alash Orda) with all subordinated spiritual bodies shall be eliminated, the files and property transferred to the jurisdiction of the suitable uezd and volost soviets. Moreover, spiritual authorities selected by their respective societies shall be prohibited from fulfilling religious needs of the citizens”

Dina A. Amanzholova, Kazakh Autonomy and Russia: the History of the Alash Movement, pg. 78

By the end of March, former members of the Alash Orda were no longer persecuted, but, except for a handful such as Baitursynov, could not participate in government work. Frunze defeated the White Army in March and rehabilitated the Kazakhs and Cossacks who once fought for the Whites. In late spring of 1920, the restrictions against the former Alash Orda members were lifted and some were allowed to work in different government bodies.

The Alash Orda started 1919 allied with a monarchist movement that refused to acknowledge their right to autonomous government. They started 1920 with their government disbanded and all power in the hands of the Bolshevik government. And yet, they held out hope that they could work with the Bolsheviks to enact their reforms.

References

Central Asia: a New History from the Imperial Conquests to the Present by Adeeb Khalid

Kazakh Autonomy and Russia: the History of the Alash Movement by Dina A. Amanzholova

The “Russian” Civil Wars: 1916-1916 by Jonathan D. Smele